

NSC DRIFTING

1 October 1958

State Department review completed

## TAIWAN STRAIT

conf., statements,

\* || Aside from US-Nat rels involved in Secy's 30 Sept. press

1. There has been little change in political aspects of Taiwan Strait situation during past week.

A. Chinese Communists are standing pat. Their public statements give impression they believe pressure in free world is building up against US position.

B. Soviets have given no hint they plan to raise Strait issue in UN at this time.

1. Soviet newspapers have, however, placed new stress on seating of Communist China in UN as "only solution" to Taiwan Strait crisis and have even asserted this is the prerequisite for "averting war."

2. Communists may be waiting for further build-up of tension before making their move in UN. Ambassador Lodge is apprehensive that several UN members (especially in Latin America) may cease backing the US if issue becomes one of "war or peace."

C. Chinese Nationalists continue their opposition to any concessions to Communists. Improvement in Chinese supply picture (evidenced by offshore island sit. itself) has lessened pressures in Taipei for unilateral action against mainland.

- II. Chinese Communists, Nationalists, and Russians all apparently waiting further developments in Chinkiang blockade situation.

25X1

Should not memo include, as a bkg. section, a brief acc't of Nat. reactions thus far to Secy. Dulles' 30 Sept. remarks? I feel that this does cover [redacted] in the fol. aspects:  
Also, what does this bkg. for US-Nat rels., & for [Continued next p.]

- A. Supply deliveries improved during last week, but average daily totals still below minimum requirements of garrison. (Daily average last week 176 tons, previously was 190 tons; minimum requirement 300 tons daily.) Taiwan Defense Command confident, however, minimum totals can soon be supplied.
1. Bad weather, which will continue through winter, forced cancellations convoys three days last week.
  2. As of 20 September food stocks on Chincoteague totaled 36 days and ammunition stocks 29 days.

3.4(c)

1949 AD

III. Chicom have made no new moves to tighten blockade. However, as supply picture brightens and Nationalist air force continues its excellent performance, Chicom may come to believe their negotiating position has been weakened and decide to up military stakes.

Sherman↓Still 2pp. 3ThisThrust↓See ourRemarkson last p.

- A. Intensification of artillery interdiction. Latest photo intelligence shows 150 new gun positions opposite Chincoteague, making a total of about 1,000 positions, not all occupied. (Now about 570 guns there.)
- B. Mining of sea approaches. We have no evidence that Chicom considering this course, but we think it is a possibility.
- C. Air attacks against sea and air supply lines.

25X1

1. So far, Communist aircraft have made no attacks on convoys,

25X1

25X1

Chances of military or Nat. action? [FE, OPA, gun; US in for a period of greater responsibility + furthering of Nat. security, actions are somewhat [redacted] as to date. The would still 55-45, [redacted] in future

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000060001-9

3. So far, one Nationalist transport plane has been lost to antiaircraft fire, none to fighters.

D. Communists could also increase pressure by more direct action such as seizure of Taten and Thretan. 25X1

E. Communists could begin operations against hitherto untargeted Hsiung--interdiction or attack.

F. Finally, Chicom could make frontal assault on Chingmen itself, but this seems unlikely at present.

IV. Before taking any direct action, however, we think Chicom would want to improve performance of their air force.

A. We noted last week that there is evidence of high-performance aircraft operating in strait area (possibly MiG-19--FARMER) but no such aircraft have been used in combat.

B. Chicom might also want to use better pilots.

25X1

1. US embassy in Moscow cites first indications in Soviet press that Soviet air force personnel being prepared psychologically for "volunteer" service in Far East.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000060001-9

C. Chinat use of Sidewinder missile has provoked a strong propaganda reaction from Peiping, and may result in Chicom use of similar Soviet-made weapons.

I. Peiping calls Chinat use "criminal action" and promises "punitive blow" against Chinat air force.

V. Chinese Communists also continue their numbered warnings against US armed "provocations" (18th was issued on 20 September). Make no threat of counter-action, but we suspect Chicom may be considering one or more of the courses listed above with the object of:

- A. Increasing pressure on US in Warsaw talks and/or,
- B. Provoking unilateral Chinat action which would give the Communist bloc a case to take to the UN.

VI. But, "Considering" doesn't mean they'll do this. This is a possibility, though we continue to judge that C.C. pressure will remain about as have been for several future

This briefing note repeats yesterday's performance: i.e., ticking off capabilities plus above & TV - we suspect that they are considering. Net effect of this briefing is an ext. [redacted] + State? view that C.C. pressure may

cf. [redacted]

slacken in time. (more 3 shades) ext. on C.C.'s -

O/C - One in

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000060001-9

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000060001-9